Saxakali Magazine 3:1 The Effects of Deforestation and Mining: Floods `96?

Saxakali Magazine V3N1
Environmental Issues:

Floods '96
Effects of Deforestation and Mining?

How It All Started

In the beginning of June, 1996, floods started on the east coast of Demerara when the Mahaica, Mahaicony and Abary rivers overflowed their banks. By mid-July, the capital was threaten with major flooding and a decision was made to divert water from the massive East Demerara water catchment to the already overflooded Mahaica river. At the end of July, old and new coastal and interior areas were being affected, including New Amsterdam, the second largest city.

In Mahaica, the amerindian villages at St. Cuthbert and St. Francis were flooded out. Shortly afterwards, the Demerara and Berbice rivers overflowed their banks. The Pomeroon and Mazaruni/Potaro rivers, Barima and other inland creeks in the interior, all overflowed their banks. The Rupununi savannas were also flooded. Large numbers of interior amerindian villages were under as much as six feet of water, such as Moca-Moca, Phillipi, Parishana, Nappi, Achiwib, andd Apoteri. The peoples' staple food crop, cassava, was destroyed. Other interior settlements like those in the upper Demerara river - Rockstone, Mauritario, Malali, Coomacha, Three Friends and Butaba were also seriously flooded.

In the Essequibo region where the malaysian company, Barama, owns and operates on a five million acre land concession, the Morawhanna river and small creeks all overflowed their banks and over 1,000 amerindians were affected. The logging community at Wineperu was severely inundated. Clay dams had to be build at Bartica to keep the Essequibo from overflowing its banks. By mid-August, villages in the upper essequibo region and lower Pomeroon were still under water and residents in dire need for food and medical supplies. Islands in the Essequibo river such as Leguan, were flooded in late August.

Nine of the 10 administrative regions of the country were submerged and over 50,000 thousand guyanese lives were disrupted, their property destroyed, and practically all economic activity ceased. Thousands of acres of rice in Black Bush Polder and other areas were destroyed. In the Mahaica region alone, losses were estimated at G$70M. There were large numbers of dead livestock and other animals which polluted the rivers and drinking water became a problem for many. Livestock losses ran in the hundreds of millions of guyana dollars.

Contradictions: Hiding the Flood

The floods of 1996 started in May, however it was only when a private television station began reporting on the floods in early June that the problem became national news. At that time, mainly amerindian villages in Mahaica were being affected. Ironically, the tv station was critized for reporting on the floods and making the image of the government 'look bad.' By mid-June, when rumors of flooding on an extensive scale began to circulate locally and abroad, the government still refused to officially acknowledge the problem and alert the guyanese people as to the threat they faced.

By the end of June, facing a national disaster, the president was forced to suddenly declare the entire country in a state of national emergency. The army and police were mobilized. G$60M was available immediately, and another G$104M was given, to assist a national disaster relief committee. Local donations of G$1.7 million, and US$465,000 in foreign aid, were received. About 2,210 families were supplied with food by the end of July.

The Cause of the Floods

Top government officials suggested several causes for the 1996 floods: an `abnormal' amount of rainfall for the first six months of the year; `unusually' high ocean tides which prevented the flood waters from reaching the sea, inadequacy of flood control measures in coastal areas, global warming, and so on. Meteorological officials said that 33 inches of rainfall were recorded by stations along the coast in May and June, which was more than twice the seasonal average.

Official explainations mainly served to lay blame for the causes of the flood on `unusual' natural phenomena beyond the control of the government. They also serve to mislead the public as to the possible dangers of future, even more severe flooding. Several important questions remain regarding the government's characterization of the disaster.

If the cause of the floods was due to heavy torrential rains, why is it that the coastal areas west of the capital were the only area not to be submerged? Is it because this is the only area where it did not rain as much, or where there are no major rivers? The link between flooding in a land of many rivers cannot be ignored. Deforestation is an important contributory factor, as the people living in the Barama concession and other logging areas, were among the most severely inundated.

The statements made by various government officials conviently ignores the fact that the 1996 floods were neither `abnormal' or `unusual.' There were floods in the dryland savanna region in May 1995, which was the worst floods in memory. The 1995 floods caused many villages such as Moco Moco, Napi and Kuma to be evacuated. In July, amerindian villages in the Rupununi district, crisscrossed by the Takatu and Rupununi rivers, were also submerged. Some residents were forced to leave for neighboring brazil in search of food and water. Food and supplies made available through the World Food Program were airlifted to amerindian areas in the upper Mazaruni region.

Incidentally, these areas have large numbers of medium-scale miners whose operations wash out the riverbanks and cause waterlogging. In August, 1995, some travelers noted that there were still some roads under water in several of these mining areas.

As happened this past year, in 1995 government officials blamed the floods on heavy rains in the interior. However, on-site observers of both the 1995 and 1996 floods noted that siltation of the rivers is a problem. `Ordinary' residents themselves complained of the deterioration and lack of repair of drainage facilities, and the silting of drainage canals. Although the government announced plans to desilt rivers, the issues of deforestation, soil erosion and mining were not related to river siltation. The recent IMF loan of G$900 million for a flood-control project will be wasted if mining and deforestation continues.

Stop Eroding Our Rivers